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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RONALD CUNNINGHAM,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
V.

Case No. 20638

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH MEDICAL
CENTER,
Defendant/Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Can appellant show, solely upon the record before this
Court, that the lower court erred in granting respondent's
Motion to Dismiss?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an action for alleged medical malpractice arising
from the performance of a surgical procedure upon plaintiff
Ronald Cunningham by Dr. Michael H. Stevens at the University
of Utah Hospital on January 28, 1982.

Plaintiff claims that

Dr. Stevens was negligent in his medical treatment of plaintiff, that his negligence caused injury to plaintiff, and that

-1-
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defendant University of Utah (incorrectly identified as
University of Utah Medical Center) is vicariously liable for
plaintiff's damages on agency principles because of its
employer-employee relationship with Dr. Stevens at the time of
the surgery.
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss in the lower court on
the ground that plaintiff's claim against the University had
already been adjudicated in a separate action filed by plaintiff in the same court against Dr. Stevens in his individual
capacity.

The lower court, the Honorable Philip R. Fishier

presiding, granted defendant's motion.

This appeal followed.

Statement of Facts
Plaintiff Ronald Cunningham underwent surgery at the
University of Utah Hospital on January 28, 1982, following
several weeks of observation, treatment and testing.

[R. 3-4.]

Cunningham's treating physician and surgeon was Dr. Michael H.
Stevens.

[R. 4.]

At all times relevant to plaintiff's

allegations in this action, Dr. Stevens was an employee of the
University of Utah through its Hospital and School of
Medicine.

[R. 2.3

Plaintiff claims he did not know of

Dr. Stevens' employment relationship with the University until
February 5, 1984.

[R. 3, 5-6.]

Plaintiff filed this action on January 18, 1985.

[R. 2.]

Plaintiff's claims against the University are based solely on

-2-
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its status as Dr. Steven's employer; plaintiff does not allege
any independent acts of negligence on the part of the
University.

[Brief of Appellant, p. 6.]

The University filed a Motion to Dismiss in response to
plaintiff's Complaint.

[R. 10-11.]

The motion was based on,

inter alia, the ground that plaintiff's claims against the
University had previously been adjudicated by the lower court
in a separate action filed against Dr. Stevens in his individual capacity, Third District Court Civil No. C84-286.
10.]

[R.

Oral arguments on defendant's motion were heard before

Judge Fishier on January 22, 1985, pursuant to notice.

[R. 13,

21.]
Judge Fishier granted defendant's motion on the basis of
the court's ruling in the prior action.

[R. 22.] The Order of

Dismissal was entered by the court on March 7, 1985.
No objection was made to the order.
Appeal was filed on April 5, 1985.

[R. 22.]

Plaintiff's Notice of
[R. 25-26.]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
An appellant has the affirmative burden to show, solely
upon the record before the appellate court, that the lower
court erred with respect to the order in question.

The plain-

tiff in this case is unable to make such a showing, and the
order of the lower court must therefore be presumed to be
correct and valid.

-3-
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The lower court's order should be affirmed, even if the
Court chooses to consider plaintiff's arguments based on the
matters presented by plaintiff which are outside the appellate
record.

Judge Fishier's order gives appropriate deference to a

prior order of the lower court denying plaintiff leave to amend
his Complaint to state his claim against this defendant.

The

attempted amendment was futile because plaintiff's claim is
barred by his failure to file a timely notice of claim as
required by the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO CARRY HIS BURDEN OF
SHOWING UPON THE RECORD ON APPEAL THAT THE
LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS.
An appellant has the affirmative burden of showing, upon
the record on appeal, that the lower court erred with respect
to the order or judgment from which the appeal is taken.
Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499, 500 (Utah 1976); accord Hamid
v. Sew Original, 645 P.2d 496, 497 (Okla. 1982) [Legal error is
not presumed from a silent record].

Under Utah law, the judg-

ment of the lower court is presumed correct until this affirmative burden has been met.

Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 16

Utah 2d 97, 396 P.2d 410, 412-13 (1964).

-4-
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The required demonstration of error must be made solely
upon the appellate record.

This Court has consistently

followed the well-recognized rule of appellate review that
matters not a part of the record on appeal need not, and indeed
cannot, be considered in connection with the appeal.

Uckerman

v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah
1978); In re Estate of Cluff, 587 P.2d 128, n. 1 (Utah 1978).
This rule was recently reaffirmed by this Court's opinion in
Robinson & Wells, P.C. v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844 (Utah 1983).
Justice Oaks, for a unanimous court, wrote:
Plaintiff does not contest these propositions,
but maintains that the reasonableness of its fees is
not before us on this appeal. In arguing this point,
both parties encumber their briefs with assertions of
facts about what went on in the hearing before the
arbitrator for which there is no reference to the
record and no support in the record. We ignore all
such matters and base our decision solely upon the
facts shown in the record.
669 P.2d at 846.
Utah law charges the appellant with the responsibility and
burden of bringing before the reviewing court a record upon
which the merit of his position can be ascertained.

Bennett

Leasing Company v. Ellison, 15 Utah 2d 72, 387 P.2d 246
(1963).

In the absence of an appellate record sufficient to

document the alleged trial court error, the judgment of the
lower court is presumed valid and must be sustained.

Where

only a partial record is presented to the reviewing court, it

-5-
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is presumed that the remaining record below supports the judgment of the trial court.

Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 16

Utah 2d 97, 396 P.2d 410, 413 (1964); Bennett Leasing Company
v. Ellison, supra at 247.
In Richards v. Anderson, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P.2d 59 (1959),
this Court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claim for damages arising from an intersection collision.

The Court wrote:

When a summary judgment is granted against a
party, he is entitled to have the trial court, and
this court on review, consider all of the evidence and
every inference fairly to be derived therefrom in the
light most favorable to him. This rule, relied upon
by the plaintiff, is not very helpful here because the
only facts before us are contained in the abovementioned documents and the recitals in the judgment
signed by the trial court based upon the pretrial
conference. In the absence of any other record it
stands unassailed as reflecting the facts presented to
the court. If the plaintiff contends to the contrary,
he has the burden of bringing the record here to show
otherwise, because the burden is upon the appellant to
show error.
337 P.2d at 60 [footnotes omitted].
The order of the lower court in this case must be affirmed
on appeal since plaintiff is unable to substantiate his claim
of error upon the appellate record before this Court.1

1

Plaintiff makes one argument for reversal upon the appellate record, claiming error in the form of the lower court's
order. Plaintiff argues the order is in fact a summary judgment since the court took judicial notice of matters outside
the pleadings, viz. Judge David B. Dee's order denying plaintiff leave to amend in his prior action against Dr. Stevens.
(Continued)

-6-
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Plaintiff encumbers his brief with statements and arguments not
supported by the record concerning what occurred in his other
action against Dr. Stevens, and also attempts to bring before
this Court, through inclusion in the appendix of his brief,
documents which are not a part of the record on appeal.

These

matters cannot be considered by the Court in deciding this
appeal, in keeping with the authorities cited above and the
current Rules of Appellate Procedure.

See URAP, Rule 10(h)

[record may only be corrected, modified or supplemented by
stipulation of parties, order of district court or order of
supreme court].

Plaintiff cannot establish on the basis of the

appellate record that Judge Fishier*s order was not properly
based on res judicata or that he should have reconsidered the
merits of plaintiff's claims.

1

[Brief of Appellant, Statement

(Continued)

This argument is without merit. The trial court may take judicial notice of its ruling in other prior or pending cases, so
long as the parties are made aware it is doing so. Carter v.
Carter, 563 P.2d 177, 178 (Utah 1977). The parties in this
case do not dispute that the prior order was called to Judge
Fishier1s attention. Whether the dismissal based on that prior
ruling was styled an order or judgment is of no effect; it is
the substance of the document not its title which controls.
Cf. Dunham v. Travis, 25 Utah 65, 69 P. 468 (1902) [it is facts
set up in pleading, and not name given to it, which determines
whether it is answer or counterclaim]. Most importantly,
plaintiff has waived any argument over any irregularity in the
form of the order by failing to make a timely objection before
the lower court.

-7-
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of Issues, p. 1.]

The order of the lower court is therefore

presumed correct and valid and should be affirmed.
One prior decision of this Court is similar enough to the
primary issue posed in this appeal and its attendant factual
setting that counsel feels an ethical obligation to bring it to
the Court's attention, even though the majority opinion is
inconsistent with the authorities discussed above and contrary
to defendant's position.
In Parrish v. Layton City Corporation, 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah
1975), the Court reviewed a summary judgment granted defendant
by the lower court on the ground that plaintiff was barred from
recovery by the res judicata effect of a dismissal of a prior
claim he had filed in the same court, and by his continuing
failure to comply with the notice of claim provisions of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

542 P.2d at 1087.

The opinion states:
A survey of the record reveals that defendant
never submitted a copy of the pleadings and judgment
in Civil No.17649 to the trial court, either in its
pleadings or in company with its motion for summary
judgment. The mere fact that there was a record of
another action on file in the clerk's office did not
place these records in evidence. Rule 68(1) and (3)
U.R.E., and Rule 44(a) and (d) U.R.C.P., provide the
methods by which a judicial record may be proved.
Since the record of the prior action was not before
the trial court, there is no basis to sustain the
determination that plaintiff's claim was barred by the
doctrine of res judicata.
542 P.2d at 1087 [footnotes omitted].

-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Parrish Court's analysis is inconsistent with the other
decisions of this Court discussed above upholding the principle
that the appellant must demonstrate on the basis of the appellate record that the lower court erred; the burden is not upon
the respondent to prove the lower court acted correctly, rather
that is presumed.
The dissenting opinion in Parrish, authored by Justice
Ellett and concurred in by Justice Crockett, is consistent with
this Court's other pronouncements and states the better rule:
I dissent from the holding that the trial court
could not find res judicata. The main opinion says,
"A survey of the record reveals that defendant never
submitted a copy of the pleadings and judgment in
Civil No. 17649 to the trial court."
The true statement should be that the record does
not show that the files in Civil No. 17649 were not
before the trial court. There is no transcript before
us, and it is mere speculation to say that counsel did
not hand file No. 17649 to the judge and say, "Will
Your Honor take judicial notice of papers in this
file?"
We presume the judge acted properly and based his
ruling on credible evidence. One who attacks the
judgment of the Trial Court has the burden of showing
error, and when the transcript of a proceeding in
court is not brought before us, we cannot speculate
that perhaps there was no proper evidence to sustain
the ruling made.
542 P.2d at 1089 [footnote omitted].
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POINT II
THIS APPEAL IS AN ATTEMPT BY PLAINTIFF TO
CIRCUMVENT THE PRIOR RULINGS OF BOTH THIS
COURT AND THE LOWER COURT. THE LOWER
COURT'S ORDER SHOULD BE AFFIRMED SINCE IT
GAVE PROPER DEFERENCE TO A PRIOR CORRECT
RULING OF THE SAME COURT.
This appeal, like the filing of this action in the lower
court, is an overt attempt by plaintiff to circumvent the
effect of Judge David B. Dee's prior order denying plaintiff's
Motion to Amend his complaint in the prior action against
Dr. Stevens.2

This defendant does not approve of plaintiff's

attempt to seek a review of Judge Dee's order by introducing
matters for this Court's consideration which are beyond the
appellate record.

Should the Court choose to address plain-

tiff's arguments, however, and thereby review both Judge
Fishier's order and Judge Dee's prior order, the following
argument is offered.
A.

Supporting Facts.

Plaintiff's allegations in this action are identical to the
allegations he sought to assert against the University of Utah
by way of amendment in his prior action against Dr. Stevens.
Plaintiff does not allege he was injured by any independent act

2

This Court has previously denied plaintiff's petition for
an intermediate appeal of Judge Dee's order. Ronald Cunningham
v. Michael H. Stevens, M.D., Supreme Court No. 20443 (March 20,
1985).
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of negligence on the part of the University.

He claims only

that the University is vicariously liable to him for the negligence of its employee, Dr. Michael H. Stevens ("Dr. Stevens").
At all times relevant to plaintiff's allegations,
Dr. Stevens was an employee of the University of Utah School of
Medicine.

He officed at the University of Utah and limited his

practice to the University of Utah School of Medicine and
Hospital.

The care and treatment Dr. Stevens rendered to

plaintiff was performed in his capacity as an employee of the
University of Utah.

Addendum, pp. 1-4.

Plaintiff became aware of the facts giving rise to his
claim against Dr. Stevens soon after the January 28, 1982,
surgery.

Addendum, pp. 5-6.

Plaintiff served Dr. Stevens with

a Notice of Intent to Commence Legal Action on June 9, 1983, in
care of the University of Utah Hospital.

Addendum, p. 7.

The

Notice of Intent was later amended by supplemental notices.
Plaintiff commenced an action against Dr. Stevens in the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Civil No.
C84-286, on January 19, 1984.

Counsel for Dr. Stevens filed a

Motion to Dismiss on the basis that Dr. Stevens was at all
times an employee of the University of Utah and was therefore
entitled to the protection of the provisions of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq.
(1977).

On the basis of that motion, plaintiff filed an

-11-
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Amended Complaint in March 1984, changing his claim against
Dr. Stevens from an allegation of ordinary negligence to an
allegation of gross negligence in an effort to comply with the
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

Plaintiff

then served the State Attorney General's Office with a Notice
of Intent to Commence Legal Action against the University of
Utah Medical Center on March 7, 1984. An Amended Notice of
Intent dated July 30, 1984, was served on the Attorney
General's Office on August 2, 1984, and on the University of
Utah Hospital on August 6, 1984.
In November 1984, plaintiff again moved to amend his
Complaint against Dr. Stevens to join the University of Utah
Medical Center as a defendant.

Plaintiff's proposed amendment

stated the identical claim asserted in this action.
pp. 8-20.

Addendum,

Plaintiff's motion was briefed, and then argued

before Judge David B. Dee on December 14, 1984.

Counsel for

the University of Utah and Dr. Stevens indicated to the Court
that they had no procedural objection to plaintiff amending his
Complaint, but that the University would thereafter file a
Motion to Dismiss based on plaintiff's failure to comply with
the notice of claim requirement of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.

In the interest of judicial economy, Judge Dee

heard argument on the University's defense.

After taking the

matter under advisement Judge Dee denied plaintiff's Motion to

-12-
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Amend on the basis that the amendment was futile since the
claims plaintiff sought to assert were barred by his failure to
serve a timely notice of claim as required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

Addendum, pp. 21-22.

Following the entry of Judge Dee's order, plaintiff filed
this action in an overt attempt to circumvent the effect of
Judge Dee's ruling by having the "new case" heard by a different judge.

The case was assigned to Judge Fishier, who saw

through plaintiff's ruse and dismissed the "new case" on the
basis of Judge Dee's prior ruling.

Judge Fishier did not

attempt to address the merits of plaintiff's claims or defendant's notice of claim defense since Judge Dee had already done
so.
B.

Res Judicata.

Judge Dee's ruling was a final determination on the merits
as to all issues pertaining to plaintiff's claim against this
defendant.

It is a final judgment as to this defendant, even

though the order is interlocutory in nature because of the
remaining claim against Dr. Stevens.

It therefore falls within

the spirit of the principle of res judicata and Judge Fishier's
order to that effect is a correct ruling.

See Searle Bros, v.

Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978) [res judicata precludes
relitigation of same cause of action between same parties].

-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The lower court's order should be affirmed whether or not
this Court finds that the situation presented fits the technical requirements for application of res judicata.

Under the

rules of appellate review, this Court will affirm the trial
court on any proper ground even if the trial court assigned an
incorrect reason for its ruling.
595 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1979).

Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine,

Judge Fishier's order should be

affirmed since it accorded proper deference to the prior ruling
of Judge Dee.3

Judge Dee properly denied plaintiff's Motion

to Amend finding that the claim plaintiff wished to assert was
subject to dismissal because of plaintiff's failure to comply
with the notice of claim provision of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12, and the amendment was
therefore futile.
C.

Futility of Amendment.

Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and cases
decided thereunder, do state, as plaintiff argues, that leave
to amend shall be freely given in the interest of justice.

The

trial court is granted wide discretion in determining whether
amendment should be allowed.

Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d

3

Repeated application for an order or the same relief is
statutorily prohibited, Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-19 (1977), and
may under some circumstances even constitute a contempt of
court. Hammer v. Gibbons and Reed Company, 29 Utah 2d 415, 510
P.2d 1104, 1005 (1973).
i
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165, 486 P.2d 1045, 1046 (1971) [cited in Brief of Appellant at
p. 8]. The requirement that leave to amend be freely given is
not applicable, however, when the complaint, as amended, is
subject to dismissal.

Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott

Laboratories, 630 F.2d 1383, 1389 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) [while Rule 15(a) requires
that leave to amend be freely given, this requirement is not
applicable when the Complaint, as amended, would be subject to
dismissal]).
A similar situation was presented to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Evans v. United
States Veterans Admin. Hospital, 391 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1968).
In that case the plaintiff filed a negligence action against
the Veteran's Administration Hospital.

Plaintiff later sought

to add the United States as a party under the provisions of the
Federal Tort Claims Act.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the

dismissal of the lower court as to the hospital and further
stated:
Furthermore, plaintiff is foreclosed from amending her
complaint to add the United States as a party and
thereafter proceeding under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, since the two year period of limitations under
the federal statute has already run. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2401. Finally, Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure which allows a claimant to amend a
Complaint to add a party and still have the amendment
relate back to the date of the original pleading, is
inapplicable here. In the instant case no notice of
the pendency of the claim was given to the United

-15-
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States within the limitations period of the Federal
Tort Claims Act. [Footnotes omitted].
391 F.2d at 262.
If Judge Dee's determination that plaintiffs claim against
the University was barred by his failure to comply with the
notice of claim requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act is correct, plaintiff's amendment was futile under the
cited authorities and Judge Dee acted correctly in denying
plaintiff leave to amend.
D.

Notice of Claim Defense.

A review of the merits of Judge Dee's ruling on the
University's notice of claim defense shows clearly that
plaintiff's claim is barred as a matter of law and does not
warrant remand to the lower court for further consideration.
Under Utah law, the timely filing of a notice of claim is a
condition precedent to maintaining an action against the state
or its employee.

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code

Ann. § 63-30-1 et seer. (1977) provides:
A claim against the state or its employee for an act
or omission occurring during the performance of his
duties, within the scope of employment, or under color
of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is
filed with the Attorney General and the agency
concerned within one year after the claim arises. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1977).4

4

As used in this Act, "the state" includes any hospital,
college or university of the state. Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-2(1) (1977).
-16-
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A claim is deemed to arise for purposes of § 63-30-12,
"when the statute of limitations that would apply if the claim
were against a private person begins to run,"
§ 63-30-11(1) (1977).

Utah Code Ann.

Since this is an action for medical

malpractice, the applicable statute of limitations is that
contained in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-14-1 et seq. (1977).
Section 78-14-4 of the Health Care Malpractice Act provides
that the limitations period for filing a medical malpractice
action commences to run when the plaintiff discovers, or
through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered,
the injury.

The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted this provi-

sion to mean that the limitations period begins to run when the
plaintiff or patient discovers or should have discovered that
he has sustained an injury and that the injury may have been
possibly caused by the negligence of the health care provider.
Foil v. Ballinqer, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979).
In this case plaintiff admits that he was aware of the
facts giving rise to his claim against Dr. Stevens "soon after
January 27, 1982."

Addendum, pp. 5-6.

Since plaintiffs claim

against the University of Utah Medical Center is based solely
on its status as Dr. Stevens' employer, plaintiff discovered
his "legal injury" against the University at that same time.
He then had one year, or until approximately January 27, 1983,
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to file the appropriate notice of claim with the Attorney
General's Office and the University of Utah Hospital.

Plain-

tiff did not comply with the notice of claim requirement,
however, until August 1984, more than one and a half years too
late.

His claim as to the University of Utah Medical Center

and Hospital is therefore barred as a matter of law, as the
lower court properly found.

Yates v. Vernal Family Health

Center, 617 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1980).
Contrary to plaintiffs argument, the running of the
statute of limitations upon his claim against the University of
Utah does not turn upon when he "discovered" the employment
relationship between the University and Dr. Stevens.

The "dis-

covery of legal injury" concept adopted in Foil v. Ballinger,
supra, does not impact on issues of agency and employment.
Foil does not hold that a legal injury is discovered only when
a patient knows the identity of all persons or entities
involved in his care and the relationship between those persons
or entities.

Indeed, such a holding would not be consistent

with the Court's reasoning.

The Foil court adopted the "legal

injury" concept because of the unique nature of medical malpractice cases and the great disparity in knowledge of medical
procedures between patients and doctors.

That same uniqueness

and disparity of knowledge do not exist in matters respecting

-18-
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identification of parties and agency relationships.

Informa-

tion about a prospective defendant's employment is as easily
obtainable by an injured automobile driver.

Foil therefore

does not excuse plaintiff's failure to file a timely notice of
claim.
None of plaintiff's authorities are to the contrary.

None

of the cased cited by plaintiff deal with principles of
agency.

None of them suggest that the running of the statute

of limitations as to an employer should await the discovery by
the plaintiff of the fact of the defendant's employment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, respondent respectfully asks
that the judgment of the lower court dismissing plaintiff's
Complaint and action be affirmed.
DATED this

/"

day of October, 1985.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

G%yt**fS)(/.

By

^W^—

Merlin *R. Lybbert
Bruce H. Jensen
Attorneys for Respondent
SCM1491U
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MERLIN R. LYBBERT
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
'
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: 521-9000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

RONALD CUNNINGHAM,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL
H. STEVENS, M.D.

VS.

Civil No. C84-286
MICHAEL H. STEVENS, M.D. ,
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
)
)

ss.

MICHAEL H. STEVENS, Upon being first duly sworn, deposes
and says:
1.

That he is the defendant named in the above-entitled

action.
2.

That at all times mentioned in plaintiff's Complaint

he was an employee of the University of Utah School of Medicine,
with the rank of Associate Professor of Surgery.
3.

That at all times mentioned in plaintiff's Complaint

the treatment and care rendered to plaintiff was done in his
capacity as an employee of the University of Utah and during
Digitized by
Hunter Law Library,
Reuben Clark Law
School,
BYU.
the performance
ofthe Howard
his W.duties
and J.within
the
scope
of his emMachine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ployment, as aforesaid.

±L
~* Michael H. Stevens, M.D
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
1984.

(&P

&<

S/^tfj/rpsMl

day o

M.\3*>yttSL

Notary Public
Residing at ^J/T

2-
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V.
^MxA.

n

MERLIN R. LYBBERT
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: 521-9000

i

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

RONALD CUNNINGHAM,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF G. RICHARD
LEE, M.D.

vs.

Civil No. CB4-2B6

MICHAEL H. STEVENS, M.D.,
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
)
)

ss.

G. RICHARD LEE, M.D., upon being first duly sworn, deposes
and says:
1.

That since the

i Ri-

day of

March

, 19 78

» he

has been the Dean of the University of Utah School of Medicine,
with the rank of Professor, and as such is familiar with the
status and terms of employment of physicians at the University.
2.

Beginning prior to the 29th day of December, 1981,
m

Michael H. Stevens, M.D., was employed as an Associate Professor
of Surgery in the School of Medicine by the University of Utah.
3.

That in connection with the services of Dr. Michael H.

Digitized
by the Howard W. Hunter
Library, J.whether
Reuben Clark Law
School, BYU.
Stevens at the
University
of Law
Utah,
rendered
in his capacity
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

as a teacher of medical principles and procedures or in connec- .
tion with the care and treatment of patients, such activities are
i

carried out as a part of his duties as an employee of the University of Utah School of Medicine and within the scope of his employment.
4.

That his treatment and care of Ronald Cunningham com-

mencing on or about December 29, 1981, were undertaken and rendered in his capacity as an employee of the University of Utah
Hospital and within the scope of that employment.

§/

G. Richard Lee, M.D.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this SAJL

day of

, 1984.

Notar^Public
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires:

/a-t-ff^
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JOSEPH S. KNOV7LTON
Attorney at Law
845 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

1
2
3

84102

5

T. RICHARD DAVIS
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST
68 South Main, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

6

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

4

7
8

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

9

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

10
H

a RONALD CUNNINGHAM,

12 I
13 '

Plaintiff,
vs

-

14 jj MICHAEL H. STEVENS, M.D.,
15 1

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT
Civil No. C84-286
(Judge David B. Dee)

Defendant.

16
17

Plaintiff respectfully submits the following Memorandum of

18 I Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion to Amend Complaint

19

Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

20

(a) A party jr.ay amend his pleading once as a
matter of course at any time before a responsive
pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the
action has not been placed upon the trial calendar,
he may so amend it at any time within twenty days
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend
his pleading only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires. . . .

21
22
23
24
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provides that a claim against the State is deemed to arise when
the Statute of Limitations would otherwise commence against a
1

private person.

2

must be filed within one year after the claim arises.
^

3

Section 63-30-14 states that a Notice of Claim

Plaintiff suffered severe physical injury on the 27th day

of January, 1982. Beginning soon after that date. Plaintiff was
4

.|

5

informed and aware of facts giving rise to his claim against Dr.

6

Stevens.

7

was not informed of his legal injury as caused by the University

8

of Utah Medical Center until the 7th day of February, 1984. This

9

lack of knowledge was at least partially caused by Dr. Stevens1

However, despite reasonable diligence exerted, Plaintiff

failure to inform Plaintiff of his agency and employment relation-

10

ship.

11

In any event, Plaintiff did not through reasonable diligence!

Ij
12 «, discover his "legal injury" until more than two years after the
liii

13 !: actual misconduct.
14
In Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 147 Utah (1979), the

i!
15

Utah State Supreme Court declared that the Statute of Limitations i

I:
i

17 jI; commences
of the "legal
The Utah Court
with the
16
on a injury."
medical malpractice
claimcited
only and
uponagreed
the discovery

•

18 : Oregon Supreme Court in Berry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996, 998 Or.

,n S
19
20

(1966):

21
22
23
24
ji

To say that a cause of action accrues to a
person when she may maintain an action thereon
and, at the same time, that it accrues before
she has or can reasonably be expected to have
knowledge of any wrong inflicted upon her is
patently inconsistent and unrealistic. She
cannot maintain an action before she knows
- 4 she has one.
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J O S E P H S. KNOWLTON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
6 4 6 EAST AOO SOUTH
TELEPHONE
665-5101

SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH S 4 I 0 2

AREA CODE SOI

May 26, 1983

yVrt?

DATE SERVED .
AT RESIDENCE _
UPON ^ S n 1 " 1 * *
Or. Michael Stevens
c/o University Hospital
50 Medical Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84132

-Vb*i«*

SlNDJXQnstati'e Murray Precmci
iouflly. Stale of Uter.
Deputy

3^96 Mill Hollow Circle
Salt Lake City, Utah
Dear Dr. Stevens:
I have been retained to represent Mr. Ronald Cunningham and his family
in regard to surgery that you performed upon Mr. Cunningham on or about
the 27th day of January, 1982. The surgery had been represented to Mr.
Cunningham and his family as being a minor procedure and developed into
a very serious procedure, beyond your capacity to handle in your specialty,
even though you proceeded to attempt to remedy the situation which, my
client feels, was negligent on your part and, as you know, the results
were disastrous.
The surgery took place in the University Hospital under your direction
and was conducted without Mr. Cunningham and his family having given
an informed consent as neither Mr. Cunningham nor his family nor, we
allege, you knew of the magnitude of the tumor prior to the commencement
of the surgery, which lack of knowledge on your part led to the procedures
about which he and his family are complaining.
This letter is being sent to you in order to meet the requirements of
Section 78-U-8 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 As Amended.

:

/

<

/

/

' • ' < • • • * * -

Joseph S. Know! ton

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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JOSEPH S. KNOWLTON
Attorney at Law
845 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

!'l -

• i »?,»

84102

T. RICHARD DAVIS
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST
68 South Main, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

CAn^^Tt

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

RONALD CUNNINGHAM,
Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
AMEND COMPLAINT

vs.
MICHAEL H. STEVENS, M.D.,

Civil No. C84-286
(Judge David B. Dee)

Defendant.
COMES NOW Plaintiff, through counsel, and pursuant to
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully
moves the Court for an Order allowing Plaintiff to Amend his
Complaint adding the University of Utah Medical Center as a
party Defendant and asserting causes of action against said
Defendant as set forth in Plaintiff's proposed Second Amended
Complaint attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
This Motion is supported by the Affidavits of Ronald
Cunningham and Joan Cunningham dated March 28, 1984, and the
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Affidavits of Michael H. Stevens, M.D. and G. Richard Lee, M.D.,
dated February 2 and 3, 1984, respectively, all OB file herein.
It is further supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities
filed together herewith.
DATED this

/)

day of November, 1984.

T. RICHARD DAVIS
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT to Merlin
R. Lybbert, Snow, Christensen & Martineau, Attorneys for Defendant, Michael H. Stevens, M.D., 10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor,
P. O. Box 3000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, and State of Utah,
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114, postage prepaid, on the

/J c^"day of November,

1984.
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EXHIBIT "A"

JOSEPH S. KNOWLTON
Attorney at Lav;
845 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
T. RICHARD DAVIS
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST
68 South Main, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RONALD CUNNINGHAM,
.
Plaintiff,
ys.
MICHAEL H. STEVENS, M.D., and
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH MEDICAL
CENTER,
Defendants.

:
:
. :.

PROPOSED
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

:

•

:
:
:
:

Civil No. C84-286
(Judge David B. Dee)

Plaintiff complains of Defendants and alleges:
PARTIES
1.

Plaintiff Ronald Cunningham \cas a patient at University

Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah, under the care and control of
Defendants Michael H. Stevens and University of Utah Medical
Center, beginning January 27, 1982, v;hen he suffered sericcs
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injuries by the wrongful acts and conduct of said Defendants as
hereinafter set forth.
r

2.

Defendant, Michael H. Stevens, M.D. is, and at all

times material hereto was, a physician licensed to practice and
practicing medicine in the State of Utah as a health care
provider as defined in Section 78-14-3, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended.
3.

On the 9th day of June, 1983, a Notice of Intent to

Commence Legal Action in letter form was served on Defendant
Stevens pursuant to the provisions of Section 78-14-8, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended.

Said Notice was amended and

supplemented by letters dated August 1, 1983 and December 28,
1983, both of which were duly served upon said Defendant.
4.

Plaintiff has received no response from said Defendant

to said Notices.
5.

Defendant, University of Utah Medical Center is, and

at all times material hereto was, a licensed health care provider
as defined in Section 78-14-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended and the employer of Defendant, Michael H. Stevens, M.D.
6.

On or about the 5th day of February, Plaintiff first

received notice of Defendants employment and agent relationship
with Defendant Medical Center through an Affidavit filed in
support of a Motion to Dismiss.
7.

On the 7th day of March, 1984, a Notice of Intent to

Commence Legal Action was served upon the Attorney General for
the State of Utah and on the 30th day of July, 1984, a similar
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Notice was served upon the Defendant Medical Center pursuant to

I

Section 78-14-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
8.

Plaintiff has received no response from said Defendant

to said Notice.

COUNT I
(Negligence)
9.

Beginning the 29th day of December, 1981, Defendants

undertook to provide and maintain surgical and medical care and
treatment for Plaintiff.
10.

Beginning the 29th day of December, 1981, while the

Plaintiff was a patient at the University Hospital under the
treatment and care of Defendants, Defendant Medical Center,
through its agent and employee Defendant Stevens, wrongfully,
negligently and carelessly failed to provide and maintain proper
and adequate medical and surgical diagnosis, treatment, services

|
l

and care for him.
11.

J

At the time of the wrongful, negligent and careless act

and omissions of the Defendant Medical Center through its agent
and employee Defendant Stevens, the care, treatment and services
provided to Plaintiff, including the instrumentalities employed
therein, were under the exclusive supervision, control and
management of said Defendant.

Furthermore, Plaintiff did not

contribute to his injury, the occurrence of which was more
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<

1

probably than not the proximate result of the negligence of said

2

Defendant, its agent and employee, Defendant Stevens.

3

12. As a proximate result of the negligent acts and omission

4

of the Defendant, Medical Center through its agent and employee

5

Defendant Stevens, following the surgery first performed by

6

Defendant Stevens on the 28th day of January, 1982, Plaintiff was

7

rendered temporarily comatose, suffered permanent loss of most of

8

his basic voluntary physical functions, and sustained mental and

9

emotional injury from all of which he has suffered severe and

10

excruciating pain, discomfort and disability, and from which he

11

will continue to suffer pain, discomfort, and permanent disability

12

all to his general damage in a reasonable sum.

13

13. As a further consequence to the negligent acts and

14

omissions of Defendant Medical Center through its agent and

15

employee Defendant Stevens, Plaintiff's initial hospitalization

16

was greatly prolonged, and he has been required to seek additional

17

medical treatment, has been required to employ the services of

18

doctors, nurses, therapists and other medical personnel for

19

medical care and treatment, and has incurred hospital, doctor, am

20 I other medical expenses in the approximate amount of $100,000.00,
21

and will be required in the future to incur expenses for medical

22

care and treatment all to his special damage.

23
24

14.

At the time of his injuries, Plaintiff was 54 years of

age, in good physical condition and was gainfully employed in
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producing economic benefits which he contributed to the support of
his family; he was in good health/ intelligent, and a source of
joy, companionship, happiness, support, and care of his family.
15.

As a further consequence to the negligent acts and

omissions of Defendant Medical Center through its agent and
employee Defendant Stevens, Plaintiff has suffered a complete loss
of earning capacity and ability to provide sustenance and support
for his family together with an extreme degree of impairment of
his ability to enjoy the society and companionship of his family.
16.

The pain, discomfort, and permanent disability which

Plaintiff has sustained would not have resulted or occurred if
Defendant Medical Center through its agent and employee Defendant
Stevens, had not been negligent in the care, treatment and
services administered to him, as aforesaid.
17.

Plaintiff did not discover and could not, through the

use of reasonable diligence have discovered his legal injury
caused by Defendant Medical Center until after the 5th day of
February, 1984, the day Plaintiff was first given notice of
Defendant Stevens1 employment and agency with Defendant Medical
Center.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment as hereinafter set
forth.
COUNT II
(Lack Of Informed Consent)
18.

Plaintiff adopts, and by this reference, incorporates
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herein, the allegations set forth in Paragraphs numbered 5 through
i
17 of Count I hereof
19.

On or about the 28th day of January, 1982, and there-

after, Defendant Medical Center through its agent and employee
Defendant Stevens, subjected, or caused Plaintiff to be subjected,
ft

II to certain procedures and other medical care and treatment

7

II

8

|| care and treatment, Defendants failed to inform Plaintiff of the

20. Prio rto and at the time of said procedures, medical

Q J] potential hazards or dangers incident thereto.
1Q

II

11

J) particular procedures recommended and would not have consented had

12
13

21. Plaintiff did not give his informed consent to the

the dangers and hazards thereof been made known to him.
22.

As a direct and proximate result of the unauthorized

procedures, care and treatment by Defendant Medical Center through
14
jc [I its agent and employee Defendant Stevens, Plaintiff was rendered
jg

temporarily comatose, suffered permanent loss of most of his basic

yj

voluntary physical functions, and sustained mental and

jg

emotional injury from all of which he has suffered severe and

19

excruciating pain, discomfort and disability, and from which he

20

will continue to suffer pain, discomfort, and permanent disability

2i

all to his general damage in a reasonable sum.

22

23. As a further direct consequence of the unauthorized

23 I procedures, care, and treatment by Defendant Medical Center
24

through its agent and employee, Defendant Stevens, Plaintiff's
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j

initial hospitalization was greatly prolonged, and he has been

2

required to seek additional medical treatment, has been requested

o

to employ the services of doctors, nurses, therapists and other

4

medical personnel for medical care and treatment, and has incurred

g

hospital, doctor, and other medical expenses in the approximate

g

amount of $100,000.00 and will be required in the future to incur

7

expenses for medical care and treatment all to his special damage,

g
Q

24.

At the time of his injuries, Plaintiff was 54 years of

age, in good physical condition and was gainfully employed in

2Q

producing economic benefits which he contributed to the support of

H

his family; he was in good health, intelligent and a source of

12

J°Y' companionship, happiness, support, and care for his family.

jo

25.

As a further direct consequence of the unauthorized

j4

procedures, care and treatment by Defendant Medical Center through

15

its agent and employee Defendant Stevens, Plaintiff has suffered

15

a complete loss of earning capacity and ability to provide

17

sustenance and support for his family together with an extreme

18

degree of impairment of his ability to enjoy the society and

19

companionship of his family.

20

26.

The pain, discomfort, and permanent disability which

21

Plaintiff has sustained would not have resulted or occurred if

22

Defendants had not been negligent in the care, treatment and

23

services administered to him, as aforesaid.

24

27.

Plaintiff did not discover and could not, through the
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1
II

use of reasonable diligence have discovered his rlegal injury

2

caused by Defendant Medical Center until after the 5th day of

3

February, 1984, the day Plaintiff was first given notice of

4

Defendant Stevens1 employment and agency with Defendant Medical

5

Center.

6
7

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment as hereinafter set
forth.

8
COUNT III
9
(Gross Negligence)
10
28.

Plaintiff adopts, and by this reference, incorporates

11
herein, the allegations set forth in Paragraphs numbered 5 through
12
27 of Counts I and II hereof.
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

29.

Beginning the 29th day of December, 1981, Defendant

Stevens undertook to provide and maintain surgical and medical
care and treatment for Plaintiff.
30.

Beginning the 29th day of December, 1981, while the

Plaintiff was a patient at the University Hospital under the
treatment and care of Defendant Stevens, said Defendant wrongfull
and carelessly failed to provide and maintain proper and adequate
medical and surgical diagnosis, treatment, services and care for
him, which failure was grossly negligent in the circumstances.
31.

At the time of the wrongful, grossly negligent and

careless acts and omissions of Defendant Stevens, the care,
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1

treatment and services provided to Plaintiff, including the

2

instrumentalities employed therein, were under the exclusive

3

supervision, control and management of said Defendant.

4

more, Plaintiff did not contribute to his injury, the occurrence

5

of which was more probably than not the proximate result of the

6

gross negligence of Defendant Stevens.

7

Further-

32. As a proximate result of the grossly negligent acts and

8

omissions of Defendant Stevens, following the surgery first

9

performed by said Defendant on the 28th day of January, 1982,

10

Plaintiff was rendered temporarily comatose, suffered permanent

11

loss of most of his basic voluntary physical functions, and

12

sustained mental and emotional injury from all of which he has

13

suffered severe and excruciating pain, discomfort and disability,

14

and from which he will continue to suffer pain, discomfort, and

15

permanent disability all to his general damage in a reasonable sum.'<

16

33. As a further consequence to the grossly negligent acts

17

and omissions of Defendant Stevens, Plaintiff's initial

18

hospitalization was greatly prolonged, and he has been required to <

19

employ the services of doctors, nurses, therapists and other

20 j medical personnel for medical care and treatment, and has incurred
21

hospital, doctor, and other medical expenses in the approximate

22

amount of $100,000.00, and will be required in the future to incur

i

23 I expenses for medical care and treatment all to his special
24

damage.

•
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34. At the time of his injuries, Plaintiff was 54 years og

1

i

n

age, in good physical condition and was gainfully employed in

o

producing economic benefits which he contributed to the support of

4

his family; he was in good health, intelligent, and a source of

c

joy/ companionship, happiness, support, and care of his family.
35.

fi

As a further consequence to the grossly negligent acts

7

and omissions of Defendant Stevens, Plaintiff has suffered a

o

complete loss of earning capacity and ability to provide sustenanc

o

and support for his family together with an extreme degree of

JQ

impairment of his ability to enjoy the society and companionship

H

of his family.

12

36.

The pain, discomfort, and permanent disability which

13

Plaintiff has sustained would not have resulted or occurred if

j4

Defendant Stevens had not been grossly negligent in the care,

15

treatment and services administered to him, as aforesaid.

16

37. Plaintiff did not discover and could not, through the

YJ

use of reasonable diligence have discovered his legal injury cause

18

b

19
20
2i

y Defendant Stevens until after the 28th day of January, 1982,

the day of the first surgery performed on him by said Defendant.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against the Defendants
jointly and severally, as hereinafter set forth:

22

1*

For a

23

2.

For the sum of $100,000.00 special damages for medical

24

reasonable sum for general damages;

expenses incurred, together with such other and further sums of
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1

medical-related expenses as Plaintiff may incur by -the time of

2

trial and shall reasonably incur thereafter;

3
4
5

3.

l

-

For a reasonable sum for lost earnings to date of trial

and for loss of earning capacity incurred by Plaintiff; and
4.

For Plaintiff's costs incurred herein and for such other

6

and further relief as to the Court may seem just and equitable in

7

the premises.

8

DATED this

_ ^ day of

, 1984.

9
10
JOSEPH S. KNOWLTON

11
12
T. RICHARD DAVIS
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST

13
14
15
16

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff's Address:
Salt Lake City, Utah

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

JAN 9 W8S
tt. Court

^•qgRgjmafng

MERLIN R. L Y B B E R T - A 2 0 2 9
By
~J
Dep'»wClern
DAVID G. W I L L I A M S - A 3 4 8 1
BRUCE H . J E N S E N - A 1 6 6 7
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
A t t o r n e y s for Defendant
10 E x c h a n g e P l a c e , E l e v e n t h Floor
P.O. B o x 3000
Salt Lake City, U t a h 8 4 1 1 0
Jfc
T e l e p h o n e : 521-9000
IN T H E T H I R D J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T COURT OF SALT L A K E COUNTY
STATE O F U T A H

RONALD CUNNINGHAM,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL H. STEVENS, M . D . ,
Defendant.

Civil N o .

C-84-286

Judge David B . D e e

P l a i n t i f f ' s M o t i o n for L e a v e to Amend h i s Complaint and
join t h e University o f U t a h M e d i c a l C e n t e r a s a party defendant
having come o n regularly for h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e C o u r t o n
December 1 4 , 1 9 8 4 , at 1 0 : 0 0 a.m., and p l a i n t i f f and defendant
having been represented at said h e a r i n g b y counsel and t h e
University o f U t a h M e d i c a l C e n t e r h a v i n g appeared specially
through c o u n s e l , and t h e C o u r t h a v i n g h e a r d a r g u m e n t s from c o u n s e l ,
and having reviewed m e m o r a n d a submitted b y t h e p a r t i e s , and h a v i n g
found and concluded that t h e c l a i m s alleged by p l a i n t i f f against t h e
University o f Utah M e d i c a l C e n t e r as set forth in p l a i n t i f f ' s
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r
proposed Second Amended Complaint, attached as Exhibit "A" to
plaintiff's Motion to Amended Complaint, are barred by the
Notice of Claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff's
Motion to Amend Complaint to join the University of Utah Medical
Center as a party defendant is hereby denied.
DATED this

^p

day of

J*j^£

, 19^£*T

District Lfudge

<
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Respondent to the following on the

/ - day of October, 1985.

T. Richard Davis
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST
68 South Main Street, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Joseph S. Knowlton
845 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

CFMM^N-

^dW^^—
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